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Using the Egyptian Revolution as a case study, this paper studies journalistic sourcing and verification 12 
through in-depth interviews with journalists in the United Kingdom. While the coverage of the event 13 
in the British media was dominated by civic, unofficial sources, interviews conducted in 2014 revealed 14 
that journalists only included these if no other sources were available. In fact, journalists voiced 15 
concern with regards to verification of online sources, and rarely included these as direct, first-hand 16 
accounts. Follow-up interviews conducted in 2020 point to developments journalism practice has 17 
undergone since, particularly in relation to open-source content verification. Overall, the picture we 18 
paint of British journalists’ handling of content sourced from social media is one wedged between 19 
expressed enthusiasm and cautious scepticism.  20 
 21 
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 23 
Introduction  24 
 25 
On July 7, 2005, 52 people were killed in four coordinated terrorist suicide bomb attacks on 26 
the London Underground. Within minutes of the attack, the BBC had received an unprecedented 27 
amount of audience material from citizens at the scene, amounting to more than 22,000 emails, text 28 
messages and videos shot on mobile phones. It wasn’t until much later that former BBC Producer Kevin 29 
Anderson spoke of a “watershed moment” (Luft, 2006) in journalism: TV coverage of the event turned 30 
out to be particularly reliant on footage received from the public. Thanks to its human, raw and 31 
unedited nature, the newsworthiness of such audience material was rated as extremely high. Jay Rosen 32 
referred to “the people formerly known as the audience” (Pressthink, 2006), and the term ‘citizen 33 
journalists’ – signalling a shift from previously passive consumers to active producers of media content 34 
– had become firmly embedded in public debate. Likewise, Stuart Allan noted a “tipping point” (Allan, 35 
2006) for online news, forcing a rethink of who counts as ‘a journalist’ in the aftermath of the incident. 36 
 37 
Fast forward to the Arab uprisings of 2011, and once again, media commentators spoke of a 38 
“turning point” in journalism: indeed, never before have journalists been so reliant on content sourced 39 
from social media to supplement their coverage. Given the essential role social media played for 40 
protesters in terms of organising and coordinating the civic movement, commentators began to refer 41 
to the event as a “Facebook revolution” or – analogous to the 2009 Iranian Green Movement – a 42 
“Twitter revolution”. Because the uprising was initially merely considered to be “incidental” 43 
(AlMaskati, 2012), news organisations had not sent out their correspondents until the fourth or fifth 44 
day of the event taking place, making journalists particularly reliant on social media content provided 45 
by citizens on the ground – and there was no shortage of such material. Given the extraordinary 46 
frequency of audience contributions used as sources during the London bombings, back in 2005, The 47 
Guardian asserted that “the long-predicted democratisation of the media had become a reality”.  48 
 49 
But did that really hold water in 2011? And if so – and perhaps most crucially – how did 50 
journalists verify information sourced from social media? This study responds to calls for revisions of 51 
the study of traditional journalistic sourcing practices with the advent of social media (van Leuven et 52 
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al., 2015) at a time when journalism embodies the intersection between traditional and evolving 53 
values. As such, it is a timely research endeavour during times of low levels of trust in the media overall 54 
(Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 2020), only further compounded the recent rise of 55 
sophisticated, doctored audio-visual material known as ‘deepfakes’ (Vaccari and Chadwick, 2020).  56 
 57 
Although a content analysis published in 2016 confirmed that the narrative of the event in the 58 
British media was indeed dominated by a civic, unofficial perspective (Anonymized, 2016; Anonymized, 59 
2019), however ten in-depth interviews with senior British journalists later revealed that these 60 
journalists would only include civic, unofficial sources for opinionated and non-factual statements, 61 
citing significant concern on the verification of these sources. This directly aligns with earlier research 62 
which found social media to be supplementary material which “are only used when nothing ‘better’ is 63 
available, such as when access to foreign journalists is limited, as was the case in the Arab Spring” 64 
(Lecheler & Kruikemeier, 2016, p. 163). Six additional in-depth interviews conducted in 2020 confirm 65 
that while little has changed in the way journalists source their stories, the issue of verification has 66 
become both more routinized and systematic. As such, this paper advances knowledge on journalistic 67 
sourcing and verification. Its set-up as a longitudinal study encapsulates a decade of insights into how 68 
the two components have changed since the Arab uprisings took hold, and what such change might 69 
signal for future reporting from often inaccessible places. We conclude this article with an extended 70 
discussion and agenda for future research. Ten years after the uprising, the initial euphoria felt in Egypt 71 
in the immediate aftermath of the uprising proved to be short-lived; in fact, the state of journalism in 72 
particular has moved from a temporary sense of hope to one of prolonged despair (Harb, 2019a). 73 
Furthermore, the extent to which digital verification tools have since been introduced into national 74 
newsrooms, and the level of supposed confidence journalists now have in operating with these, 75 
provide fertile ground for future studies. We touch on both issues in our discussion.  76 
 77 
Sourcing and verification 78 
 79 
 Research into sourcing and the epistemic foundation upon which journalists base their 80 
knowledge has a rich history dating back several centuries. In their formative piece ‘On the 81 
Epistemology of Investigative Journalism’ (1985), Ettema & Glasser referred to journalists’ network of 82 
sources, suggesting that journalists turn to authoritative and elite sources as trustworthy purveyors of 83 
information. Similarly, in their seminal work ‘Manufacturing Consent’ (1988), Edward S. Herman and 84 
Noam Chomsky describe how US mass media serve the ends of a dominant elite in power, placing them 85 
in a symbiotic relationship with powerful sources of information thanks to economic necessity and 86 
reciprocity of mutual interests. Two years later, in his influential article ‘Toward a Theory of Press-State 87 
Relations in the United States’ (1990), Washington University Professor W. Lance Bennett similarly 88 
observed that US mass media primarily looked to government officials as a major source of daily news 89 
reporting. However, exclusively granting public officials ‘the right to speak’ restricted diversity in the 90 
marketplace of ideas, thus risking that the media abdicate its mandate to represent all people in 91 
society. 92 
 93 
However, the gradual incorporation of user-generated content in the mainstream news flow 94 
has since led to persistent calls for reconceptualising the relationship between journalists and their 95 
sources. Various scholars (Lotan et al., 2011; Strömbäck et al., 2013) describe this interdependent 96 
relationship as a symbiosis in which formerly ‘passive’ consumers of news transform into ‘active’ 97 
producers by influencing and co-constructing the news agenda. Social media platforms such as Twitter 98 
play, it is claimed, an amplifying role in the dissemination of information (Lotan et al., 2011), which has 99 
a significant effect on the amount and availability of journalistic sources as informants. As a result, a 100 
growing number of studies addresses the question of online sourcing (Lecheler & Kruikemeier, 2016).  101 
 102 
So far, however, research portrays a contradictory image of the extent to which journalists 103 
embrace audience content. One section of the available research highlights how online sources have 104 
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genuinely shifted the journalist-audience relationship. For example, in their analysis of #Jan25 tweets 105 
during the Egyptian uprising, Lotan et al. (2011) detected information flows across a wide range of 106 
actors from divergent social backgrounds, giving rise to the notion of ‘networked journalism’ and the 107 
claim that the journalists’ gatekeeping role would decrease as a result of higher levels of self-108 
expression by individual actors on Twitter. Equally, Hermida et al. (2012) found that NPR’s Andy Carvin 109 
acted as a central node across these divergent actors during his coverage of the event on Twitter. 110 
Despite him being merely a distant witness to the events on the ground, his work in curating, gathering 111 
and filtering significant streams of information from citizens on the ground led to a higher 112 
representation of unofficial sources at the time. As such, the case of Andy Carvin is unique not just for 113 
his particular reporting technique, but for his curational role in making sense of the events on the 114 
ground – a practice also observed in the popular ‘live blog’ format (Thurman & Walters, 2012; Thurman 115 
& Schapals, 2017; Thorsen & Jackson, 2018), whose nature of an unfinished product diverges from the 116 
central characteristics of classic news texts (Matheson & Wahl-Jorgensen, 2020).  117 
 118 
In contrast to this stand several studies which confirm journalists’ heavy reliance on 119 
established, elite sources: in her study on the British media coverage of the 2009 Iranian elections, 120 
Knight (2012) found traditional journalistic sourcing practices to prevail even in the digital age. 121 
Journalists favoured traditional voices, despite the internet’s potential of providing raw, unedited 122 
audience material. However, journalists heavily quoted government officials or other institutionally 123 
affiliated spokespeople, meaning that “the practices of journalists and the traditions of the coverage 124 
continue to ensure that traditional voices and sources are heard above the crowd” (p. 71). Similarly, 125 
newspaper coverage of the 2011 Egyptian uprising was found to be heavily reliant on conventional 126 
sources (AlMaskati, 2012). In addition, although Belgian journalists covering the Arab revolts did 127 
include ordinary citizens and non-mainstream groups as sources in their reports, they did prefer 128 
traditional source channels over user-generated content or social media (van Leuven et al., 2015). 129 
Authoritative sources were frequently quoted first in their reports to introduce an issue, while civic 130 
quotes were mainly used to express experiences and emotions of those caught up in the uprising. 131 
Further studies of Belgian journalists’ use of social media in their reporting of the Arab uprisings did 132 
confirm their struggles with verifying such content; indeed, “most journalists relied on international 133 
news media to verify the reliability of user-generated content before they incorporated it into the 134 
news output” (De Dobbelaer et al. [2013] cited in van Leuven et al. [2015: p. 560]).  135 
 136 
In sum, while the incorporation of social media into contemporary newsrooms has since 137 
become a normalised component despite its associated, and often challenging, verification (Zeng et 138 
al., 2019), the study of online sources remains a moving target. A study by Wardle and Williams (2010) 139 
on the integration of user-generated content at the BBC Hub asserts that journalists see audience 140 
material as “little more than another news source” (p. 790) and “just another journalistic source” (p. 141 
791); this is also confirmed in a more recent study with Irish journalists, for whom social media provides 142 
“an additional or alternative platform for accessing sources, rather than providing new root sources of 143 
information” (Heravi & Harrower, 2016, p. 1202). This underscores the importance of familiarity as a 144 
determining factor, which critically may be due to questions of verification, seen by some as “the 145 
essence of journalism” (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2001, p. 71). Not only does previous work indicate that 146 
audience material is predominantly used for non-factual, opinionated statements (Miller-Carpenter, 147 
2019), but crucially, journalists seemingly prefer quoting established correspondents (Lecheler & 148 
Kruikemeier, 2016), thus affirming the viability of traditional journalistic newsgathering practices in 149 
the digital age. Given the inextricable link between source credibility and civic trustworthiness in the 150 
media (Reich, 2011) – a link which is particularly pronounced during times of political upheaval – a 151 







The role of social media  157 
 158 
To examine journalistic sourcing practices during the Egyptian uprising, it is first necessary to 159 
situate and contextualise the role social media has played during the event more broadly. Sparked by 160 
initial protests in Tunisia, where street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire following the 161 
confiscation of his wares by local police, the movement soon spread to Egypt. As so aptly described by 162 
Cottle (2011), and with reference to the initial uprisings in Tunisia having sparked the subsequent 163 
events in Egypt, Bouazizi had “lit a flame that soon burned in capitals and cities across much of the 164 
Arab World” (p. 648). Commentators soon picked up on the initial euphoria, with many citing the 165 
powers of social media to mobilise their constituents. However, such widespread optimism appears to 166 
be misplaced: social media, though powerful, cannot in itself act as a catalyst to stimulate successful 167 
collective action; rather, used effectively by a technology-savvy youth, it can act as a facilitating factor 168 
to help pave the way for coordinated civic action (Harb, 2011). As such, social media had indeed been 169 
taken up by protestors as a mobilising tool, which effectively resulted in “the seizure of power by the 170 
people as part of a collective will to overthrow dictators and autocratic regimes and to effect 171 
democratic change from within” (ibid: np). Social media networks did not of themselves generate 172 
revolutions, but they were able to facilitate them, helping to generate a sense of connectedness. They 173 
created a space where people shared grievances against those in positions of authority: groups of 174 
young people, in particular, used that newly shared virtual space to demand that a corrupt political 175 
elite be held responsible for their misuse and abuse of power (Harb, 2019b). 176 
 177 
In effect, social media had thus successfully transformed from tools that were initially merely 178 
social in nature to political tools with a power not seen elsewhere before. Both the interactivity and 179 
instantaneity of social media, but also its characteristics in alerting and diffusing information at a 180 
critical time, helped citizens counter narratives by the Mubarak regime (Barrons, 2012). Thanks to the 181 
widespread diffusion of their grievances in the media, Egyptians sensed that their struggles had gained 182 
an international platform, thereby granting them a sense of legitimacy that helped further their cause. 183 
As a result of such external validation, social media managed to globalise local struggle (Yli-Kaitala, 184 
2014). Egyptians were believed to have transformed into ‘citizen journalists’ who, despite government 185 
attempts to circumvent access to the Internet, conveyed critical information at a crucial moment in 186 
time (Tufkeci & Wilson, 2012). Elsewhere, they have been referred to as para-citizen journalists, who 187 
“form temporary communities bound together by streams of information centred around a particular 188 
event” (Miller-Carpenter, 2019, p. 12). With an initial feeling that the protests were merely incidental 189 
and would not extend any further, journalists elsewhere soon found social media to be the only 190 
channel of information, making them particularly reliant on content produced by citizens to be 191 
processed in their reporting. As such – at least in its initial stages – such eyewitness content became a 192 
genuine substitute for on-the-ground reporting produced by international correspondents (Zelizer, 193 
2017). On a higher level of abstraction, the coexistence of witness accounts alongside professional 194 
journalists has been referred to as “hybrid news spaces” (Chadwick, 2013), in which “the non-journalist 195 
witness gains authority from the authenticity associated with being in close proximity to a newsworthy 196 
event and in the rawness of their accounts” (Carlson, 2020).  197 
 198 
On a more tangible level, this has raised serious issues for journalism practice, particularly in 199 
relation to sourcing and verification. First, has the event indeed been dominated by a civic perspective, 200 
or did societal elites continue to play a prominent role in journalistic sourcing, as suggested in other 201 
studies elsewhere (see, for example, Knight, 2012)? Second, if civic sources did indeed dominate the 202 
journalists’ reporting, what techniques did journalists use to verify such material, particularly when 203 
these journalists were based in their London newsrooms rather than at the scene? To answer the first 204 
question, we draw on the findings of a quantitative content analysis in parts published elsewhere 205 
before (Anonymized, 2016; Anonymized, 2019), while the second part is based on several interviews 206 
with senior British journalists and editors involved in the reporting of the event. Overall, our findings 207 
contribute original data on journalists’ sourcing practices and verification techniques at a time when 208 
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the integration of social media content into journalistic work finds itself wedged in a “transitional 209 




The findings presented here form part of a 2016 study in which we investigated sourcing 214 
practices and verification techniques deployed by British journalists during the 2011 Egyptian 215 
Revolution. To do so, we followed a hybrid methodological approach, incorporating both quantitative 216 
and qualitative techniques: in a first step, we conducted a large-scale content analysis of the frequency 217 
and types of sources journalists working across six UK national news publishers (The Daily Telegraph, 218 
The Guardian, The Times, BBC News, Channel 4 News, Reuters News) consulted during their reporting 219 
of the event. Informed by this analysis, in a second step we conducted an additional in-depth 220 
interviews with senior British journalists having reported on the uprising during the 18-day time period 221 
(25 January to 11 February 2011). To allow for comparisons, this included ten journalists interviewed 222 
in 2014 and six additional journalists interviewed in 2020. 223 
 224 
Despite their value in their own right, the interview data presented herein suffer from three 225 
interrelated limitations: first, the asynchronous nature of the six additional interviews which were 226 
conducted via email suggests that they were void of social interaction, thus making it impossible for 227 
the researcher to ask any immediate, follow-up questions, even though on two occasions, follow-up 228 
questions were posed via email. Second, the retrospective nature of all 16 interviews suggests a 229 
reliance on journalists’ very own accounts of their newsgathering patterns at the time, making it – 230 
paradoxically – impossible to verify whether or not the interviewed journalists actually remember their 231 
individual practices on such a granular level. Third, all our interviews rely on self-reported data, which 232 
might incentivise socially desirable answers and, therefore, skew on-the-ground realities. In future 233 
research, the two latter limitations could be mitigated through newsroom observations, closely 234 
monitoring journalists’ sourcing patterns and verification techniques as a breaking news scenario 235 
unfolds and journalists scramble for verifiable information. Overall, our data provides valuable, 236 
longitudinal insights into journalists’ processes of verification when sourcing material from social 237 
media. 238 
 239 
These semi-structured interviews consisted of two sections: the first was centred on specific 240 
techniques journalists employed in terms of sourcing; the second questioned the respective strategies 241 
they followed in terms of verification to uncover the ‘black box’ of journalistic decision-making 242 
processes in a breaking news scenario. According to Lotan et al. (2011), journalists face several 243 
challenges when verifying content during fast-moving events: the differentiation between ‘true’ 244 
information and rumours; and the origin of news and the continuous evolvement of selected events, 245 
making it difficult to establish the veracity of claims made. Broadly speaking, guided questions 246 
included:  247 
 248 
• What role has social media played in your newsroom during the Egyptian uprising? 249 
• What strategy did you follow in sourcing information during the Egyptian uprising? 250 
• What challenges do you face when verifying content sourced from social media?  251 
• Do you feel that your role as a journalist has changed as a result of social media?  252 
• How do you verify content sourced from social media? 253 
 254 
During the data collection process, in a separate spreadsheet, the by-lines of the authors of 255 
these articles were collected. A total of n = 50 journalists appeared particularly often across the sample. 256 
These were first contacted by e-mail and, if necessary, by telephone after an initial written reminder 257 
was sent out. Overall, ten journalists responded to the initial interview request, which includes four 258 
each from Channel 4 News and BBC News, and one each from The Times and The Daily Telegraph. 259 
Except for two interviews, which were conducted via Skype due to the correspondents’ ongoing stay 260 
in the Middle East, the interviews were carried out in the journalists’ respective offices in central 261 
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London in 2014. Six follow-up interviews with journalists involved in the reporting of the event were 262 
conducted via email in 2020. This included three from Channel 4 News and three from BBC News (one 263 
of whom specifically works for BBC Arabic). All interviews were transcribed verbatim and clustered 264 
based on emerging themes using the NVivo software package. This facilitated the process of weaving 265 
in “a narrative which is interpolated with illustrative quotes” (Gillham, 2000, p. 74) and allowed for a 266 
cohesive analysis and presentation of results.  267 
 268 
Results  269 
 270 
Overall, the results paint a picture wedged between expressed enthusiasm and cautious 271 
scepticism when it comes to online sourcing and the connected practice of verification. While we only 272 
present some anecdotal evidence that the latter has become both more routinized and systematic, we 273 
hope that, in remembering the Arab revolts, these results serve as a useful starting point for a better 274 
understanding how and if the movement facilitated changes in the relationship between digital 275 
journalism and digital activism. 276 
 277 
Supplementary role of social media 278 
 279 
Despite early predictions of a ‘Facebook revolution’, in 2014, those British journalists covering 280 
the uprising regarded the use of social media merely as another source of information that would help 281 
them make sense of the events on the ground. Social media were equated with a wire service that may 282 
well provide journalists with a broader source choice, but that would not change the rules of the game 283 
altogether. One journalist at Channel 4 News said that “it [social media] is just another source of 284 
information, another branch to the tree if you like. I don’t think it fundamentally changes the rules of 285 
journalism or the way journalism works, which is to gather information and to corroborate it – you 286 
check it, you interrogate it, and you tell people what your take on it is” (personal communication, 21 287 
September 2014). By this token, social media seemed to have worked as an ‘extra newsfeed’, a 288 
constant stream of information that would provide journalists with useful tip-offs as to what was 289 
happening at any given moment in time. Similarly, one of his colleagues at Channel 4 News was wary 290 
not to overstate the use of social media at the time. To his mind, social media had not changed much 291 
other than providing both producers as well as users of news with a broader source choice. In fact, 292 
“they [users] now have a broad choice between so-called established channels or going for social 293 
media and getting it in a kind of more raw, unfinished version” (personal communication, 12 294 
September 2014). Another Channel 4 News journalist, also based in Egypt during the uprising, 295 
concurred. In her opinion, the use of social media offered an additional source of information, 296 
especially at times when journalists were not present at the scene, and when there would otherwise 297 
be no reporting from the area whatsoever. When talking about the transformations brought about by 298 
the inclusion of social media platforms on the international news agenda, she said: “What social media 299 
has done is that it has opened up places, and parts of stories which would otherwise be 100% dark. 300 
There would simply be no information. So, that’s why social media is useful” (personal communication, 301 
15 September 2014).  302 
 303 
The exclusivity of social media when faced with news vacuums was also a recurring theme 304 
during the follow-up interviews conducted in 2020. Social media gave power to ‘the people’ when 305 
documenting the events on the ground and shone light on otherwise inaccessible places. A Channel 4 306 
News journalist said that such material helps “lifting the lid on what’s happening in far-flung places” 307 
(email interview, 26 April 2020), and a BBC News journalist concurred with that assessment when she 308 
said that it “let[s] us know about otherwise hidden stories of our time” (email interview, 26 May 2020). 309 
While such material sourced from social media was praised for its characteristics of adding diversity, 310 
richness, excitement, and intimacy to a journalists’ output, interviewees were eager to stress that it 311 
would only work “hand-in-glove” with further methods for source corroboration and verification. In 312 
the words of another Channel 4 News journalist: “Social media is another source and another tool. It 313 
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helps. But it hasn’t changed my primary job, which is, far as possible, to be an eyewitness reporter” 314 
(email interview, 18 April 2020).  315 
 316 
Overall, while there was expressed enthusiasm about the affordances of social media in 317 
documenting otherwise in accessible places, there was agreement that social media would alter little 318 
other than providing additional source material, and that it cannot act as a replacement to the very 319 
essence of traditional forms of journalism. This aligns with previous research characterizing audience 320 
material as “little more than another news source” and “just another journalistic source” (Wardle & 321 
Williams, 2010, p. 791).  322 
 323 
Value of eyewitnesses 324 
 325 
However, this is not to say that British journalists covering the Egyptian uprising dismissed the 326 
value social media offered to their reporting. They did recognize their ability to provide raw and 327 
unfiltered accounts out of Egypt but used them mainly to cover the general ‘feel’ of certain situations 328 
as they unfolded across the country – however very rarely for factual civic statements. This is evident 329 
from a statement made by a BBC News reporter interviewed for this project, who at the time was 330 
responsible for producing its live blog. To cover the general ‘feel’ of the situation on the ground, his 331 
reporting was strongly tied to civic accounts from the scene, while the final resignation by Mubarak 332 
was more strongly tied to official sources due to the importance of the reaction of the international 333 
community to this truly compelling event (personal communication, 16 September 2014). This is 334 
congruent with a journalist’s opinion who at the time was responsible for producing The Daily 335 
Telegraph’s live blog. She believed that the use of social media was primarily centred upon gathering 336 
diverse opinions rather than pure facts and attributed the popularity of social media as a 337 
newsgathering tool to the ability to cover the general atmosphere, or ‘feel’, of a situation. In her words: 338 
“The whole period was a turning point in terms of how we looked at using social media and we were 339 
quite nervous to start off with, but as the momentum gathered, it became more about demonstrating 340 
a mood rather than hard facts” (personal communication, 2 October 2014).  341 
 342 
For factual statements, reporters were reliant on “usual suspects” (Thurman & Walters, 2012); 343 
that is, a reliance on individuals who have been attributed with dependability and trustworthiness in 344 
the past. These findings mirror the fact that, in the quest for finding verifiable content on social media, 345 
journalists demonstrate a reliance on individuals who had been proven to be trustworthy in the past 346 
and who are verifiably ‘real’ people being in one way or another involved in the event at the time (as 347 
evidenced, for example, by the journalists’ frequent sourcing of material posted by online activist and 348 
Google executive Wael Ghonim at the time). One BBC News journalist, for example, referenced 349 
journalists’ “restrictive” types of sources in their output, thus instead defaulting towards those “that 350 
could be verified by other means” (personal communication, 16 September 2014). This is also 351 
congruent with the account provided by one Channel 4 News interviewee: even when sourcing from 352 
social media, she would still try to trace the source to its origins, contact a person she deemed as 353 
‘trustworthy’ (“usual suspects”), meet up with them and try to investigate the matter further. For her, 354 
the journalistic profession still constitutes itself in being active at the scene:  355 
 356 
On the whole, you’re [still] out and about; I’m not sitting in a hotel room following the Internet. I’m on 357 
the street doing my own reporting, and so if there’s extra stuff on Twitter, that’s very useful. [But] my 358 
basic method is the same: I go somewhere. I talk to people. I find out what’s going on. … That is what I 359 
call journalism. I went there and saw this. I saw this for myself with my own eyes, and my camera 360 
operator filmed it … that is journalism; that is what I did. 361 
 362 
(Personal communication, 15 September 2014)  363 
 364 
 The same pattern was also evident in the follow-up interviews. Indeed, journalists continued 365 
to stress the crucial role of eyewitnesses present at the scene and continued to rely on sources they 366 
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deemed to be both honest and dependable. One journalist mentioned the importance of local experts 367 
he would seek corroboration from – preferably those whom he met in person in the past – a practice 368 
he justified by saying that “confirmation has never been more important” (email interview, 26 April 369 
2020). Unless journalists were thrown into a news vacuum – during which the role of social media 370 
would change from supplementary to exclusive – journalists’ traditional sourcing practices still applied. 371 
In the words of one BBC News journalist: “Nothing substitutes for on-the-ground reporting” (email 372 
interview, 10 June 2020).  373 
 374 
As such, journalists voiced a preference towards the remnants of traditional journalism. The 375 
value of local activists was rooted in the emotional component they added to a story (Miller-Carpenter, 376 
2019); in turn, so-called “usual suspects” (Thurman & Walters, 2012) whom journalists had relied on 377 
in the past or whose accounts were easily verifiable by other means were particularly likely to be 378 
included in the journalists’ news output.  379 
 380 
Accelerated publication cycles 381 
 382 
By a similar token, a further significant finding was the journalists’ use of secondary, ‘recycled’ 383 
material which had already been published elsewhere. Given the commercial rivalries between 384 
competing news outlets, this is surprising, and Tereszkiewicz (2014) concurs that “this approach stands 385 
against the natural and widespread competitiveness among news outlets” (p. 308). Four journalists 386 
openly admitted using this strategy in their reporting. A Channel 4 News journalist, for example, 387 
admitted to “look at live blogs on newspaper websites, The New York Times and The Guardian 388 
especially, but I will pick things and say, ‘oh look, they’ve got an interesting video, can we see if we can 389 
find that ourselves?’, but I won’t take all of it” (personal communication, 12 September 2014). The 390 
New York Times as a useful resource was also mentioned by the BBC News reporter, who had, for 391 
example, drawn inspiration from their compelling infographics. Besides, he kept an eye on broadcaster 392 
Al Jazeera, which is where in fact he had first caught wind of the uprisings. He regarded this process of 393 
observing each other’s news output as a useful tip-off service, and in instances where verification was 394 
impossible to achieve, even demonstrated a sole reliance on this particular news channel (personal 395 
communication, 16 September 2014). A journalist for The Times, for example, praised Al Jazeera for 396 
their reporting and for being very “agile” in getting information rapidly (personal communication, 30 397 
September 2014). Being responsible for the production of the live blog of The Daily Telegraph at the 398 
time, their journalist was openly following journalists from Al Jazeera as well as CNN, an act she 399 
considered to be acceptable when dealing with challenging situations covering wide-reaching 400 
geographical areas. In fact, she echoed Tereszkiewicz’s (2014) viewpoint when she said that “to be 401 
honest, it was almost like everybody was looking at each other to see where things are coming from. 402 
… It’s really the only sensible way in which you can operate, because otherwise, everybody gets a tiny 403 
bit of the story as opposed to getting the whole story” (personal communication, 2 October 2014).  404 
 405 
Corroboration with other media outlets was a theme also prominent in the follow-up 406 
interviews. Apart from the value of local eyewitnesses, journalists stressed the role of “other, formal, 407 
trusted, and traditional media sources” (email interview, 29 April 2020), “news agencies” (email 408 
interview, 26 May 2020) as well as cross-referencing by other means, such as observing the respective 409 
in-house two-source rules. While they conceded that this was a “gold standard” (email interview, 18 410 
April 2020) worth adhering to, real-life constraints – such as working towards tight deadlines in 411 
evolving scenarios – would place a burden on this standard. Indeed, they sensed that fast-paced 412 
situations would encourage journalists to take a risk, leading one Channel 4 News journalist to recall a 413 
near-error which had led him to “become very cautious. … Once nearly bitten, twice shy” (email 414 
interview, 26 April 2020). While there was a sense that sourcing from social media during evolving 415 
situations would require output to be “corrected, adjusted, and sometimes discarded” (BBC News 416 
journalist, email interview, 26 May 2020), potential errors and audience trust was a factor journalists 417 
were acutely aware of. In the words of one BBC Arabic journalist: “I am always afraid of this issue, and 418 
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I have made some mistakes that I already regret as a result of rushing to rely on news broadcast on 419 
social media” (email interview, 1 June 2020).  420 
 421 
Overall, such testimonies underscore the tension between maintaining speed and yet 422 
delivering on the journalistic mantra of ensuring accuracy in journalists’ reporting – a tension especially 423 
evident during the Arab uprisings and one far from resolved nowadays.  424 
 425 
Remnants of ‘traditional’ journalism 426 
 427 
Strikingly, however, journalists were keen not to overstate the role social media had played in 428 
the event, thereby stressing the continuing prevalence of traditional journalistic reporting patterns. 429 
One Channel 4 News journalist was convinced that revolutions such as the Egyptian uprising were still 430 
about what would eventually translate into events on the streets, not about what was initially 431 
happening on the screens. Social media, and Facebook in particular, he stressed, were important as 432 
means to setting up the demonstrations in the first place. Other than that, however, he saw little to 433 
no changes to the journalistic profession as such. To his mind, “it’s just about assessing and weighing 434 
all the different bits of information, and, as ever, condensing it down to a narrative” (personal 435 
communication, 12 September 2014). One of his colleagues at Channel 4 News emphasised the 436 
importance of traditional corresponding, i.e. in the form of reporting from the ground. To him, social 437 
media do not work as a substitute to traditional journalism but can instead be used as an excellent tip-438 
off service to establish essential focal points in the uprising. Other than that, however, he 439 
demonstrated a firm belief in traditional journalistic working practices: “You apply the same values of 440 
trying to be accurate, trying to source your stories, trying to check your stories before just going on air 441 
with any old rumour that you see on Twitter” (personal communication, 21 September 2014).  442 
 443 
Further, one BBC News journalist stressed the importance of traditional journalistic norms and 444 
values which would have to be adhered to, despite the transformations brought about by the digital 445 
age. Both accuracy and impartiality were among these, along with the necessity to conform to 446 
traditional ways of journalistic reporting. In her opinion, “regular journalism still has a future” (personal 447 
communication, 29 September 2014). Despite the advantages brought about by the use of social 448 
media, such as a useful tip-off service, she was wary not to overstate their wider effects. Instead, she 449 
demonstrated a firm belief in traditional means of communication and remembered the civic ability to 450 
finally have “normal” conversations on Tahrir Square. These were with people from all walks of life, 451 
and their lively face-to-face exchanges made for fruitful debates she had physically experienced herself 452 
(ibid). By so doing, she echoed the opinion of The Times’s journalist not to regard social media as a 453 
substitute for traditional means of reporting. She was convinced that  454 
 455 
A lot of people think Twitter is it. Perhaps they think that social media is a replacement for actually going 456 
out and meeting people, for actually making contacts and speaking to people. But Twitter isn’t 457 
everything. It’s not a replacement for being on the ground, being there, seeing something with your 458 
own eyes, interviewing people, making contacts – that has a real premium.  459 
 460 
(Personal communication, 30 September 2014) 461 
 462 
Such a view also aligns with the follow-up interviews. Again, social media was described as a 463 
“guide and tipster” by a Channel 4 News journalist (email interview, 26 April 2020). As such, although 464 
journalists did not dismiss its value – particularly in inaccessible places, where the (unpalatable) 465 
alternative would be a lack of reporting altogether – they were eager to stress the remnants of 466 
traditional journalism, even years after the uprising taking place. Asked whether her newsgathering 467 
practices had changed because of social media taking hold, another Channel 4 News journalist stressed 468 
that they were the “same as always!” (email interview, 18 April 2020). Considering the profound 469 
transformations journalism as an industry had undergone since, a BBC News journalist said: 470 
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“Everything has changed, and nothing has changed in journalism. … There is still no replacement for 471 
the face-to-face, heat-and-dust, kind of journalism” (email interview, 26 May 2020).  472 
 473 
This corresponds to previous research having found that “journalists commonly stick with 474 
traditional methods such as turning to previously trusted sources or contacting them directly to check 475 
their credibility” (Nygren & Widholm, 2018, p. 42). As such, while journalists recognised that journalism 476 
as an industry is changing, their adherence to the remnants of ‘traditional’ journalism remained 477 
remarkably intact. 478 
 479 
Verification practices 480 
 481 
 Adhering to the remnants of ‘traditional’ journalism was indeed a theme that featured 482 
prominently amongst our interviewees. Yet, numerous factors compromised the critical role 483 
verification played for journalists at the time: several correspondents were not actually on the ground, 484 
particularly not in the early stages of the uprising taking place, likely a result of it being merely seen as 485 
“incidental” (AlMaskati, 2012) at the time and, thus, not expected to lead to any significant outcome. 486 
Interviewees reflected on the extent to which the events unfolding in Egypt had taken them by 487 
surprise, which resulted in their heavy reliance on content from social media – sourced from activists 488 
and citizens alike – in their reporting. Others, who were not subsequently sent out to Egypt, continued 489 
to report on the events from their London newsrooms, leading one BBC News journalist to reflect on 490 
his struggles in “overcoming the knowledge gap” and experiencing “sourcing complications” when 491 
incorporating content lifted from social media to supplement his coverage (personal communication, 492 
16 September 2014). Likewise, his BBC News colleague, who has based in Egypt at the time, “got lost 493 
in a fog of uncertainty” immediately following the resignation of Hosni Mubarak, citing the ongoing 494 
political volatility in the country and uncertainty as to where it would be heading next. She said: “When 495 
the truth becomes so complicated and when public opinion becomes so divided, this is when … you 496 
have to become even more cautious of social media and fact-checking” (personal communication, 29 497 
September 2014).  498 
 499 
In countering such uncertainty, two interviewees referenced specific techniques they 500 
deployed in order to have claims made on social media further substantiated: a BBC News journalist, 501 
for example, cross-referenced pictures claiming to come out of Egypt with webcams placed around 502 
Tahrir Square to corroborate their accuracy, and used Google’s reverse image search to check if the 503 
picture had appeared elsewhere, and possibly in a different geographical context, before. A Channel 4 504 
News journalist spoke of double-checking if a multitude of users had been tweeting the same picture 505 
instead of relying on an isolated case, or whether the same incident had been tweeted from different 506 
angles.  507 
 508 
That said, however, the journalists’ techniques were characterised by a degree of randomness 509 
rather than consistency. As such, in the various instances in which content could not be independently 510 
verified, they demonstrated a heavy reliance on caveats, or house warnings, to convey that the veracity 511 
– particularly of visual material – could not be determined beyond reasonable doubt. Yet, according to 512 
the journalist working at The Times, such content would still merit publication, saying “once you accept 513 
that you have to be guarded about how you treat the information, it’s incredibly valuable in itself” 514 
(personal communication, 30 September 2014). A BBC News journalist concurred with the importance 515 
of issuing house warnings, referencing cases where videos he had seen on YouTube claiming to come 516 
out of a particular location were actually filmed elsewhere. Strikingly, one Channel 4 News journalist, 517 
also an Arabic speaker, bemoaned this practice, stating “the story of verification has made the world 518 
worse” (personal communication, 22 September 2014). In referencing journalists’ heavy reliance on 519 
established correspondents, to his mind, journalists were often too “frightened” to use eyewitness 520 




Unlike the previous four sections – which concerned themselves exclusively with sourcing, and 523 
which detected no major changes – the practice of verification has changed, as anecdotal evidence 524 
presented herein indicates. What was initially an act of randomness seems to have been replaced by 525 
greater consistency and systematicness in the pursuit of accuracy. Although the issuing of house 526 
warnings is still made use of at times when confirmation cannot be attained beyond reasonable doubt 527 
– as mentioned by all six interviewees – overall, one Channel 4 News journalist, for example, described 528 
the process of verification as “easier” and mentioned feeling more “comfortable” due to his 529 
increasingly routinized experience in the process (email interview, 29 April 2020). Open-source 530 
investigations were mentioned by four journalists, in addition to forensic video verification, including 531 
geo-location techniques.  532 
 533 
Open-source investigations in particular were described by a BBC News journalist as doing “an 534 
amazing work of verification” (email interview, 26 May 2020), and a colleague at Channel 4 News 535 
described these as “a new dawn of journalistic enterprise” (email interview, 26 April 2020). Reflecting 536 
on the past ten years, the same journalist felt that verification  537 
 538 
Has evolved into a much more serious business than it was ten years ago, founded on the premise that 539 
you can no longer believe what you see – until you are certain that what you see actually happened 540 
where and when it purports to have happened. … The professional instincts of a trained reporter have 541 
never been more critically important than they are today in a world where there is so much inaccurate 542 
nonsense purporting to be ‘news’ on social media (ibid).  543 
 544 
Although unrelated to the Arab uprisings of 2011, recent prominent examples when journalists 545 
used open-source investigations included the case of Dominic Cummings – the PM’s advisor – who 546 
falsely claimed to have highlighted the risk of a coronavirus pandemic on his personal blog in early 547 
2019. Originally uncovered by a data scientist, the BBC eventually ran the story in May this year (Islam, 548 
2020). Another recent – but unrelated – example is the speculation that surrounded North Korea’s Kim 549 
Jong-Un’s alleged death in April this year. Analysing satellite imagery of Kim Jong-Un’s private train in 550 
close cooperation with North Korean analysts provided cues as to his possible whereabouts (BBC News, 551 
2020). This underscores the extent to which the process of verification comes closer to a “acceptable 552 
plausibility” (Phillips, 2014) – in other words, an approximation of the actual events on the ground, 553 
rather than providing incontrovertible confirmation.  554 
 555 
Discussion: Beyond Egypt 2011 556 
 557 
 Such continuous difficulty begs the question of what transformations, if any, have occurred in 558 
this field beyond 2011, and what they mean for the practice of digital journalism and digital activism 559 
more widely. 560 
 561 
Ten years on from the Arab revolts, activists in Egypt are as divided as state of journalism itself 562 
– between those acting as a mouthpiece for the regime, and those whose voices are critical to convey 563 
the economic hardship, political corruption, and social injustices the country still faces (Harb, 2019b). 564 
These days, much of that narrative is, on one hand, centred on nationalistic and patriotic sentiments, 565 
and on the other, based on persistent fears and insecurities that just one year of the rule of the Muslim 566 
Brotherhood had brought to the country. The regime has succeeded in manipulating that fear – each 567 
and every time voices of dissent, mainly conveyed through social media, had risen to prominence 568 
(ibid). Accounts of trolling occurring on these platforms – used to deter journalists and activists from 569 
sharing critical views – are widespread. The extent of fear journalists and activists experience daily, 570 
both physically and psychologically, have thus extended to the virtual space. Social media trolls have 571 
engaged in campaigns to disseminate disinformation aiming at undermining the credibility and 572 
objectives of voices critical of the regime. Many of those voices have become more cautious and fearful 573 
for their safety whenever engaging in social media activity.  574 
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In eerie resemblance to 2011, the crackdown on journalists in Egypt, both local and foreign, 575 
continues: the latest of such clampdowns was a raid on the offices of the independent news outlet 576 
Mada Masr, resulting in the arrests of three journalists, including its editor-in-chief Lina Attallah and 577 
two French journalists from France 24 who happened to be present at the scene. The new public 578 
sphere social media generated during the 2011 revolt in Egypt (Harb, 2011; Khamis & Vaughn, 2011; 579 
Khamis & Vaughn, 2014; Wolfsfeld et al., 2013; El-Nawawy & Khamis, 2013; Brym et al., 2014; Herrera, 580 
2014; Wolver, 2016) has been hijacked by authorities, who have been using social media effectively to 581 
clampdown on any dissident voices. Consequently, the lack of safety and security foreign journalists 582 
continue to experience has put pressure on international media to find alternative sources of news 583 
coming out of Egypt.  584 
Such difficulty journalists face can be transferable to other regions with similar authoritarian 585 
regimes and authoritarian media systems, such as Syria. Here, the lack of on-the-ground reporters 586 
working for global news networks only exacerbated the aforementioned tensions evident in Egypt. We 587 
argue that the popularised term of the ‘Arab Spring’ suggests a misleading universality of what are, 588 
indeed, very distinct local conditions across several Arab countries. The same note of caution must be 589 
applied to the equally popularised ‘citizen journalism’ concept: importantly, the act of producing 590 
citizen journalism is rooted in predominantly Western contexts, suggesting a direct link between 591 
journalism, democracy, and an ‘enlightened’ citizenship – a narrative which risks overlooking the local 592 
conditions under which it is produced (Al-Ghazzi, 2014; 2019). Meanwhile, foreign journalists’ access 593 
to information in Egypt via social media has become ever more testing; accordingly, assessing the 594 
credibility and veracity of sources have become defining challenges for journalists.  595 
 These challenges have been neatly explored more recently in studies by Brandtzaeg et al. 596 
(2016; 2018), who have also pointed to journalists’ adherence to the remnants of ‘traditional’ 597 
journalism. In the course of it, the authors identified five approaches most prevalent in journalists’ 598 
pursuit of accuracy. These include: a reliance on trusted sources; the use of eyewitness material; 599 
traditional methods; though rare, a use of existing verification tools; as well as workaround methods, 600 
including the issuing of house warnings. As such, traditional approaches to verification are frequently 601 
interwoven with novel, technology-driven endeavours (van Leuven et al., 2018), as indeed our findings 602 
indicate. According to the authors, “a fact, and the process behind the development of that fact, should 603 
be linked to a reliable process and method that can be replicated” (Brandtzaeg et al., 2018, p. 1123). 604 
To further this goal, in the short term, they suggest a more frequent use of existing tools whilst 605 
acknowledging and being open about their limitations, as well as an increase in transparency by 606 
encouraging users to check questionable facts themselves. Moving forward, empowering users 607 
through shared, collaborative fact-checking would go a long way to increase trust in fact-checking 608 
services specifically (ibid.), and in social media content generally. In the long-term, suggestions include 609 
an increased emphasis on curriculum development in educational institutions to make online 610 
verification a priority amongst journalism educators and students (Brandtzaeg et al., 2018). Another 611 
suggestion includes organisational, in-house training for journalists in using existing verification tools 612 
effectively in an attempt to move towards universally consistent patterns, as well as raising awareness 613 
for algorithmic bias when using search engines, requiring specialist knowledge beyond the surface level 614 
of operating within the interface (Lecheler et al., 2019). We will revisit these suggestions in the 615 
concluding section. 616 
 617 
Conclusion  618 
 619 
This study explored journalistic sourcing practices and verification techniques during the 2011 620 
Egyptian Revolution and beyond. In pursuing this dual agenda, it is worth remembering that 621 
verification techniques are “the most fundamental part of studying online sourcing” (Lecheler et al., 622 
2019, p. 7); as such, they are not divorced from one another, but instead are inextricably linked. In 623 
addition, this study responds to an earlier study by van Leuven et al. (2015) calling for a revision of 624 
traditional journalistic sourcing with the advent of social media. In remembering the Arab revolts, we 625 
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first revisited our previous 2016 study which found that the narrative of the event in the British media 626 
was dominated by a civic, unofficial perspective, thus potentially opening up the public sphere to lesser 627 
represented voices during times of political crises. It is thus not unfounded to assume that the frequent 628 
inclusion of unofficial perspectives to some degree attributed citizens with a degree of legitimacy for 629 
their grievances to resonate in the international media, informing the outside world of the events on 630 
the ground.  631 
 632 
Yet, despite the open and transparent spaces of online communication, the in-depth 633 
interviews conducted afterwards point to the extent to which journalists perceived the role of social 634 
media as supplementary rather than exclusive – unless they were thrown into a news vacuum, which 635 
is when social media served as the sole means to ‘keep the story going’. While journalists seemed 636 
enthusiastic about its affordances – particularly added diversity, richness, excitement, and intimacy in 637 
their output – they stressed that its real value serves a complement to existing practices of sourcing 638 
and verification. These practices include, first and foremost, journalists’ heavy reliance on known 639 
individuals – preferably those they had themselves met in-person on past occasions – as well as 640 
established news outlets and agencies – particularly in fast-evolving situations, when the otherwise 641 
(unpalatable) alternative would be a lack of reporting altogether. Apart from this, journalists strongly 642 
adhered to the remnants of traditional journalism and the value of on-the-ground reporting. While 643 
they readily acknowledged the profound changes the industry as a whole had undergone since the 644 
uprisings taking place, their existing modus operandi remained remarkably intact – which of course 645 
could be the result of our sample consisting largely of seasoned, veteran reporters (and, thus, a 646 
possible limitation of this study).  647 
 648 
Despite the evident intactness when it comes to journalists’ online sourcing, there was some 649 
anecdotal evidence of movement relating to their verification techniques. While the Arab uprisings 650 
had taken journalists by surprise – often scrambling to curate accurate information – some of their 651 
testimonies presented herein point to a degree of routine and system as a result of accumulated 652 
experience since. This includes the role of specialist staff – such as the widely-cited ‘UGC hub’ at the 653 
BBC, or Channel 4 News’s practice of employing Arabic-speaking staff trawling through social media – 654 
for corroboration purposes and the use of open-source material. Although we only present anecdotal 655 
evidence for an increase of the latter, its use when reporting from far-flung, inaccessible places such 656 
as North Korea has already surpassed more ‘traditional’ newsgathering techniques (Seo, 2020), which 657 
again underscores the importance of considering the local conditions under which journalism is 658 
produced. The picture we paint in our longitudinal study on British journalists’ perceptions of social 659 
media for sourcing and verification is one wedged between expressed enthusiasm and cautious 660 
scepticism.  661 
 662 
That said, it is important to interpret these findings in light of the study’s limitations: our overall 663 
sample size remains low, and a broader sample would have led to more generalisable patterns. 664 
However, our sample size still far exceeds McCracken’s recommendation of a minimum of eight 665 
interviews in qualitative research (McCracken, 1988). In future, and as raised in the extended 666 
discussion, the issue of verification of content sourced from social media deserves more attention. 667 
With digital technologies becoming ever more sophisticated, and with social media not offering a static 668 
point of reference, it would be worth investigating journalists’ familiarity with, and ease of, using 669 
advanced verification tools. For example, what of journalists’ internet literacy (Lecheler & Kruikemeier, 670 
2016) and their existing use of and confidence in computational news discovery tools, such as the 671 
SocialSensor application (Thurman et al., 2016)? At a time in which the proliferation and spread of 672 
misinformation online extends to increasingly sophisticated, doctored video material such as 673 
‘deepfakes’ (Vaccari & Chadwick, 2020), an inquiry into journalists’ proficiency in detecting 674 
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